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ABSTRACT (297 words) 
 
Objective: A multi-disciplinary support team for general practice was established in April 2014 
by a local NHS England management team. This work evaluates the team’s effectiveness in 
supporting and promoting change in its first two years, using realist methodology.  
Setting: Primary Care in one area of England. 
Participants: Semi-structured interviews were conducted with staff from 14 practices, three key 
senior NHS England personnel and the five members of the support team. Sampling of practice 
staff was purposive to include representatives from relevant professional groups. 
Intervention: the team worked with practices to identify areas for change, construct action 
plans and implement them. There was no specified timescale for the team’s work with 
practices, it was tailored to each. 
Primary and secondary outcomes measures: in realist evaluations, outcomes are contingent on 
mechanisms acting in contexts, and both an understanding of how an intervention leads to 
change in a socially constructed system and the resultant changes are outcomes.  
Results: the principal positive mechanisms leading to change were the support team’s expertise 
and its relationships with practice staff. The ‘external view’ provided by the team via its 
corroborative and normalising effects was an important mechanism for increasing morale in 
some practice contexts. A powerful negative mechanism was related to perceptions of ‘being 
seen as a failing practice’ which included expressions of ‘shame’. Outcomes for practices as 
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perceived by their staff were better communication, improvements in patients’ access to 
appointments resulting from better clinical and managerial skill mix, and improvements in 
workload management.  
Conclusion: the support team promoted change within practices leading to signs of the ‘green 
shoots of recovery’ within the timeframe of the evaluation. 
Such interventions need to be tailored and responsive to practices’ needs. The team’s expertise 
and relationships between team members and practice staff are central to success. 
 
Strengths and Limitations 
 Realist methodology is recognised as appropriate and relevant for evaluating complex 
interventions in health care environments. 
 All practices which engaged with the team in its first two years were involved in the 
evaluation and a range of staff were interviewed, not only those in leadership roles. 
 Practices which did not engage at all with the team also declined to participate in the 
evaluation; the views of this important group of practices are therefore not 
represented.  
 Some areas of discussion included sensitive topics such as negative emotions, which 
limited the depths of discussion 
 The study is embedded in the context of a highly inspected, highly regulated service: 
generalizability to less heavily managed systems cannot be assumed.  
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 Two of the evaluators work as general practitioners in the medical community in which 
the team works and this may have led to bias, however their practice of reflexivity 
reduces the impact of this. 
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Word count 4176 
INTRODUCTION 
Universal access to high quality primary care is an important driver of the health of a 
population.[1] Although the United Kingdom (UK) offers universal access to primary care, there 
are substantial differences in the quality of care provided by its general practices.[2] In the UK, 
general practice quality is measured and monitored using a range of quality indicators[3-7] and 
inspections by the Care Quality Commission (CQC),[8,9] a regulatory body which has a statutory 
responsibility to ensure that health and social care in the UK is safe and effective.    The quality 
data and the CQC’s reports are publicly available and failures to reach these standards 
consequently become public knowledge; this ‘naming and shaming’ has become part of the 
process of improving accountability within UK’s National Health Service (NHS).[10,11] 
While staff are a key determinant of the quality of care provision, a 2006 literature review[12] 
regarding team effectiveness in healthcare concluded that there is no single model of an 
‘effective team’; team composition and function need to be tailored to their purpose. No clear 
direction could be given for the creation or maintenance of a ‘high-functioning team’. 
Nevertheless, team leadership is important: Aranzamendez concluded that ‘psychological safety’ 
for teams arising from the characteristics of leaders has a high impact on health care quality.[13] 
Other literature focuses on the effectiveness of teams, facilitators or learning programmes which 
aim to promote specific quality improvement initiatives[14-16] rather than general 
improvements in practice function. There is some evidence from Canada that such initiatives 
improve communication, collaboration and leadership.[16] However, Dean et al reported 
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primary care teams’ concerns about wasted effort and resources being barriers to their adoption 
of quality improvement activities.[17] 
In 2014, a National Health Service (NHS) England Local Area Team (the management ‘layer’ of 
the NHS which then had responsibility for commissioning primary care medical services) 
established and funded a ‘Supporting Change in General Practice’ team (the SCGP team).  The 
SCGP team’s stated aim is to ‘improve the quality of working life for practice staff, achieve 
sustainable positive change and improve care for patients in the locality’, a population of 1.4 
million people which was served by approximately 200 general practices. It was not established 
specifically to support practices to prepare for or remediate after a CQC inspection,[8] but for 
any practice which wanted or needed help to change.  The SCGP team has five members, all of 
whom are employed solely to undertake this work and all have relevant experience in the NHS; 
a general practitioner, a practice manager, a nurse, an administrator and an analyst. Practices do 
not contribute to its costs. The SCGP team does not have a regulatory role and does not impose 
solutions or sanctions on practices; engagement is voluntary even in the situation of a practice 
having failed a CQC inspection. The SCGP team collates data from a variety of sources during a 
‘scoping’ stage with the practices. These data inform discussions between the SCGP team and 
practice staff in an action planning stage, which is followed by the implementation of the action 
plan, in which the SCGP team may or may not be involved and for which it maintains an ‘open 
door’ policy, meaning that there is no point at which it formally ends its relationship with a 
practice. Clinical backfill is available, provided by the team’s GP. 
Little has been published about support teams for general practices.  The only similar 
intervention of which we are aware is the UK based Royal College of General Practitioners (RCGP) 
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pilot[18] in which a team provides support for practices in ‘special measures’ after Care Quality 
Commission (CQC) inspections.[8] There are important differences in the way they operate; for 
example the RCGP team has ‘two or three advisors’ and practices are expected to contribute to 
its costs.[18] No evaluation of this team has as yet been published. 
Keele School of Medicine was commissioned by NHS England to evaluate the team’s 
effectiveness over a two-year period (April 2014- March 2016). 
METHOD 
 We used realist methodology[19,20] which seeks to explain how, why and when an intervention 
leads to change by considering configurations of contexts, mechanisms and outcomes (CMO).[19] 
. A realist evaluation is a cyclical process of making and testing hypotheses with the aim of 
specifying CMO configurations in which change has occurred. It is increasingly used for the 
evaluation of complex interventions in socially constructed settings such as healthcare.[19,20] 
We considered using a ‘quasi-experimental’ quantitative methodology[20] involving NHS 
performance indicators.[3-5] However, the way these performance indicators are applied and 
used in the NHS is not stable and they are no longer reliable measures of change.[21,22] We also 
considered quantitative measures of team function[23] but the likelihood of abreactions by 
practice teams early in the process of change[24,25] meant that these were unlikely to be reliable 
indicators of change within the timescale of the evaluation.  
 We describe one cycle of the realist evaluation process using the RAMESES II reporting 
standards.[20] 
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1. Interviews with key personnel from NHS England, the members of the SCGP team, and 
practice staff to inform the development of a conceptual foundation, or programme 
theory,[19,20] for the intervention.  
2. Data analysis from a realist perspective[19,20] to specify contexts, mechanisms and 
outcomes. We grouped mechanisms into ‘resource’ and ‘reasoning’ mechanisms, as 
willingness and ability to change depends on both the resources available and the 
reasoning behind the choices people make.[19] 
3. Further interviews with practice staff in order to test hypotheses about the CMO 
configurations which resulted in change.  
4. Development of a programme specification.[19] 
The Interviews 
We used purposive sampling for NHS England staff and SCGP team members, and stratified 
sampling for practice staff. For practice staff, we aimed for a representative variety of 
professional groups in the practices (GP principals and sessional doctors, nurses, health care 
assistants, managers, administrators and receptionists). All interviews were semi-structured, 
audio-recorded and transcribed with participants’ consent. The questions were open and invited 
comment on experiences and perceptions. 
Initial interviews with practice staff took place after the SCGP team’s scoping stage and follow up 
interviews several months later when it was conceivable that change would be identifiable. Their 
purpose was to test hypotheses thus refining the programme theory.[19,20] All the SCGP team 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
members were interviewed throughout the evaluation period, and key people from NHS England 
were interviewed once. 
The data were analysed thematically by two researchers independently and then several 
iterations of discussion organized and refined the themes in CMO configurations. 
Descriptive data relating to the practices were obtained from the SCGP team.  
Ethics 
According to the NHS research ethics decision tool[26] this work is an evaluation rather than 
research, and approval from an NHS Research Ethics Committee was not required. The project 
was discussed with the Primary Care Research and Development Manager of the National 
Institute for Health Research (NIHR) Clinical Research Network (West Midlands, UK), who gave 
permission for it to proceed on 4th April 2014. It was discussed with Keele University’s Research 
Governance Officer on 19th March 2014; approval of the University’s Ethics Review Panel was not 
required. 
The work was carried out with the intention of, as far as possible, maintaining the confidentiality 
of practices and individuals. Consequently, we have used different identifiers for practices in Box 
1 from those used in the text and tables 1 and 2   to protect confidentiality as far as possible. 
 
 
 
RESULTS 
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We report on data relating to fourteen practices. Four practices had approached the SCGP 
team, one because staff were concerned about preparing for a CQC inspection.[8,9] Nine were 
identified and approached by the SCGP team as a result of being outliers in performance 
datasets.  One practice engaged with the team as a direct result of an unsatisfactory CQC 
inspection report. 
Initial and follow up interviews were conducted for five practices. For the rest, for reasons of 
timing or staff agreement, only one set of interview data was obtained. 
The practices 
There were three rural practices (located in settlements of <10,000 people)[27] and eleven 
urban ones. The registered list sizes varied between 3000 and 15,000. The numbers of whole 
time equivalent (WTE) doctors ranged from 1.75 to 8.125 and the WTE:list size ratios from 1335 
to 3050 (the mean for England in 2014 was 1678.)[28] 
 
Interviews with the SCGP and NHS England staff 
All the SCGP team members were interviewed individually twice (April 2014, January 2015) and 
as a group three times (June 2014, August 2015, February 2016).  
Three key people from the local team of NHS England were interviewed; the Medical Director 
individually, and the Head of Primary Care and the Primary Care Lead together. 
 
Interviews with practice staff 
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A total of 72 interviews were carried out with staff from 14 practices 
 15 practice managers 
 18 GP partners who ‘led’ their practice’s work with the team 
 6 other GP partners 
 17 nurses 
 6 receptionists 
 8 administrators  
 2 sessional GPs 
 
Constructing a programme theory 
The SCGP team’s purpose was consistently viewed as being to provide help and support for 
practices which were ‘struggling’ or ‘vulnerable’. It was perceived by two NHS England staff as 
having a specific purpose in supporting practices to develop action plans as required by the 
CQC,[8,9] but this had not been originally given as a primary reason for establishing it. They had 
clear ideas about criteria for success, for example, patient survey data and other performance 
indicators; the focus being on outcomes for patients. The Medical Director (NHS England local 
team) reported that he had ‘no clear set criteria for success’, but that the team’s work would lead 
to ‘visible green shoots of recovery, maybe manpower, maybe patient satisfaction, maybe 
something else…’ and that it would be specific to each practice. His view was that ‘the NHS is 
changing too quickly to rely on some of the indicators such as the Quality and Outcomes 
Framework][3] they are no longer a stable measure…’.  
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The SCGP team’s own criteria for success changed over the two years; from initially being focused 
on outcomes for patients, by February 2016 the emphasis was on better communication within 
practice teams, increased morale, and sustainability for the practices and the individuals within 
them. The team members developed a perception that these might take time to achieve. The 
SCGP team itself did not perceive the CQC work as ever being ‘the majority’ of its workload.  
Practice staff perceived that they needed to change and were hoping that they would perform 
better as a result of the work. They speculated about benefits to themselves in terms of better 
morale and a more managed workload, and concomitant benefits for patients.  
The analysis of the interviews, with the incorporation of concepts described in the King’s Fund’s 
‘Exploring the CQC’s Well-led Domain’,[29] led to the development of a programme theory: 
 ‘When practices are identified as performing poorly, work with a multi-disciplinary team to help 
them to identify areas and strategies for improvement and then support them to implement these 
strategies, may lead to better practice performance and sustainability for individuals and 
practices. As the purpose of general practices is to provide good quality care for patients, better 
performance will lead to better outcomes for patients in the future.’ (see figure 1) 
 
Insert figure 1 here: the programme theory 
 
 
 
 
Contexts, mechanisms and outcomes  
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Contexts  
All practices were operating in the contexts of the NHS in England and their local medical 
communities. Each practice had its own context of patient demographics, staffing structures, 
service provision and challenges. Most staff were working in a context of perceived suboptimal 
management and leadership, and many with suboptimal clinical team skill mix and staff 
deployment, particularly in their nursing teams. A significant aspect of context was the route to 
engagement with the team; some had actively asked for help while some had accepted it willingly 
or reluctantly when it was offered to them. Some felt that they were individually or collectively 
‘at breaking point’ and that help was essential. Some expressed concern about why they had 
been identified as needing help and some that the reason they were offered it was never made 
clear. 
The context of the NHS in England was perceived by all as challenging; practice staff described 
themselves as being on a ‘hamster wheel’, the work being ‘pressured’ and ‘frantic’. The team 
described a set of problems common to all practices, including workload, staff recruitment, 
financial viability and personal sustainability. 
Mechanisms (table 1) 
Identified mechanisms were grouped into ‘resource’ and ‘reasoning’ mechanisms, as willingness 
and ability to change depends on both the resources available and the reasoning behind the 
choices people make.[19,20] 
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The most powerful resource mechanism was the practical expertise of the SCGP team, 
particularly of its manager, which was mediated by the nature of the relationships between 
practice staff and team members. This practical expertise included knowledge of Human 
Resources and business management, NHS processes, professional regulation and clinical skill 
development. 
The SCGP team described an action plan, owned and constructed by the practice staff, as being 
‘primary’, however, from the practice staff’s perspectives the value was variable and dependent 
on context; those practices concerned about CQC[8,9] inspections placed more value on it and 
there was evidence that they used it more in their implementation of change, particularly the 
practice in special measures after a CQC inspection. For others, action plans were more 
evolutionary and more fluidly used, or not used at all. 
The provision of clinical backfill was perceived as positive resource by some practice staff in 
that it gave doctors time away from clinical duties to take part in discussions and 
developmental work, but it was perceived by some as being part of the inspection and giving 
the SCGP team an opportunity to look at doctors’ clinical practice and find out what the 
patients thought about the doctors, and therefore caused some anxiety.  
The most powerful reasoning mechanism was the ‘external view’ provided by the team and its 
corroborative and normalising effects. In some practice contexts, this corroboration was 
perceived negatively by practice staff; they felt that the team’s work added nothing new to their 
knowledge about the difficulties they were facing. Others expressed relief that no unexpected 
problems were found by the team.  
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The most prominent negative reasoning mechanism was a concern associated with engagement 
with the team, which was expressed most strongly by the practice managers; they were worried 
about being perceived in the local medical community as ‘failing practices’ if they were known to 
be working with the team. We interpreted this as an expression of shame. 
Further negative reasoning mechanisms were the perceived generic nature of the intervention, 
and some negative aspects of the relationships between team members and practice staff which 
were related to issues of trust, both of individuals in the team and ‘the NHS’. 
Table 1: the mechanisms 
Mechanism Quotes regarding mechanisms 
Resource - 
positive 
Relationship ‘they’ve not directed us…and brilliantly have not just come and told us well, 
you need extra doctors but actually – what have you got, how can you work 
with it?  GP partner practice K 
 
‘It was one of those very rare opportunities where we’ve had people come in 
from outside who are here to offer us support and look at us in a way that I 
felt wasn’t gonna be judgmental.’ GP partner practice G 
 
 
‘They’ve been quite sensitive to the pressures that are there…they’ve not 
impacted greatly on our day to day practice…they’ve been very flexible…it 
hasn’t felt very intrusive.’ GP partner practice M 
 
‘They weren’t the inspectorate from hell.’ GP partner practice E 
 
‘…she understood where we were coming from and all the different areas 
we…sort of got issues with…that was good’ nurse practice H 
 
 
Expertise ‘Some of their suggestions have been very helpful, particularly 
trying to lighten our load with paperwork and helping with some 
changes with the nursing team.’ GP partner 1 practice C 
 
‘[the manager] was extremely helpful in looking over pitfalls in 
reception management and he helped us in interviews [to recruit 
new staff].’ GP partner practice E 
 
‘To get a report suddenly landing on your desk saying how terrible 
you are is one thing, but to get somebody coming in and saying 
well, we think you’re terrible but we’re going to try to help you – it’s 
kind of a different process.’ Manager practice H 
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‘…the big advantage the team has got it that they’ve all been 
working in general practice and know how that is…’ Manager 
practice C 
 
 
 
 
Action planning ‘We sat down and we’ve had an action planning morning … and 
[we] invited [the manager on the Team] to come back … to say 
right, this is our action plan … which bits are you going to support 
us with? … he was very good … he’s going to be coming back at the 
end of the month to arrange some other [aspects of the plan]’  GP 
partner practice C 
 
‘The action plan has been ongoing from the minute they started 
really ... it’s in place and its working ...it’s about communication.’ 
Manager practice L 
 
Clinical backfill  
‘I think the other thing that was quite useful was that [he] did a few clinics 
for us, so it released the doctors to do some of the work we needed to do…’ 
Practice Manager C 
 
‘the other thing that was quite useful was that [the team’s GP] did a couple 
of afternoon surgeries here…’ GP partner practice K 
 
Resource - 
negative 
 Time 
 
 
 Disruption 
‘There’s always a bit of anxiety about how much extra work is all 
this going to create, you know, in an already frantic job …’ Manager 
practice C 
 
 ‘I think we felt a bit- invaded is too strong a word, but I think sort of 
… we felt as if we had been taken over, rather than that we were in 
control of it.’ Manager practice N 
 
Relationship  
‘[one of the team was talking] about other places [the team] was 
going, and because of my knowledge of the area, and sort of 
awareness, [the team member] referred specifically to a change 
that was going on which I could identify…I lost confidence in sharing 
or exploring ideas I had.’ GP partner practice F 
 
‘… it was like they’d got their own agenda whereas we’d got our 
agenda …’ Manager practice F 
 
When I had my interview…[we] had a conversation about personal 
experiences [with another organisation] and so forth and didn’t feel a great 
deal of focus was on the practice to be honest… [the others] did tell me that 
they felt like they were being interviewed for a job... which I felt was a bit 
odd really.  GP partner practice D 
 
‘…a lot of talking went on and not much listening…’ GP partner practice C 
{ PAGE   \* MERGEFORMAT } 
 
 
Clinical backfill [he did some clinical work] …and that got him an insight of the patient and 
what the patient thinks about us…he didn’t find anything clinically wrong…’ 
Practice Manager practice E 
 
Action planning ‘the action plan, it seemed appropriate…I got the message, but actually I 
haven’t referred back to it…I haven’t actually shared it very much because it 
didn’t have the challenge or the affirmation which I wanted.’ GP partner 
practice F 
 
‘we haven’t referred back to it…I’m not sure if we did find it that useful…it 
was a massive long document…’ GP partner 2 practice C 
 
Reasoning 
- positive 
Perceived benefits 
 Function 
‘… if we’re a better run practice … a better team … you probably can’t 
measure it, but I’m sure there will be benefits to the patients.’ GP partner 
practice K 
 
External View  
 Corroborating 
 Normalizing 
 Advocacy 
‘I wanted some help and guidance, an external sort of peer review … to 
make sure I wasn’t completely off track’. GP partner practice F 
 
‘it’s good to have somebody look at the practice with a fresh pair of eyes 
and it’s good to have feedback so that we can improve.’ Salaried GP practice 
H 
 
 ‘…you can become very insular and sometimes you can’t see problems 
facing you and someone else coming in objectively can see what’s going on 
and things you could improve…’ Nurse practice N 
 
‘it was nice to know that we weren’t struggling in isolation, that everybody 
was dealing with the same problems, and that some of the changes we’d 
put in place were innovative and useful…’ GP partner practice J 
 
‘…we felt better for them having come and told us we were doing well’. GP 
partner practice J 
 
I do think that they’ve really identified the key problems…a third party’s eyes 
have been useful…I think it just carries a bit more weight [in getting things 
changed].  Administrator practice M 
 
‘…its sort of like another voice to say what I’m actually able to do…to help 
me develop my role to its full potential…’ Nurse practice E 
 
Reasoning 
- negative 
Shame ‘we asked why we were contacted, because we were given the 
impression it was to support failing practices and we didn’t 
particularly think we were a failing practice, and they couldn’t really 
give us an answer, and so that was a bit sort of disturbing …’ 
Practice manager 
 
‘it was seen as we were picked on because we were a failing 
practice..’ GP partner practice C 
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‘[someone] comes in and says oh yes, you’re not doing very well so we want 
to come in and help you – you know that’s a very different thing from me 
saying oh, can I have a bit of help please?’ GP partner practice C 
 
‘[the staff needed to be] assured that it’s not sinister…that they’re 
not on trial in any way. It was hard to get the staff to understand 
that [the Team] were here to support what we were doing…’ 
Practice Manager practice B 
 
‘an email came…I thought maybe someone’s picked up something 
wrong with our practice…’ Practice Manager practice D 
 
‘I think the [practice team] were a bit apprehensive – to think Oh 
God, are we in trouble…?  Receptionist practice H 
 
‘…to be suddenly told yet again that you are failing…was sad 
really…when we think we’re trying our hardest…we’d got the initial 
‘oh my God we’re terrible again…’ Practice manager practice H 
 
‘…[we] felt very exposed and vulnerable [as a result of being 
contacted by the SCGP team]’ GP practice C 
 
Regulation/inspection ‘[some people] were completely freaked out by the idea that a team could 
come along and look at how you were working and felt that it was another 
CQC or Big Brother sort of thing… a sort of policing service. GP partner 
practice M 
 
‘ …they were like a Big Brother coming in, checking, saying oh , oh you need 
to be reported to managers, chief whatever it is…’ GP partner practice E 
 
‘…[people] were all saying we don’t want them coming, I think they looking 
at it as an inspection process…they are being used by NHS England to go in 
to support practices that are failing.’ Manager practice M 
 
 
 
Mistrust ‘… we were a bit suspicious really, because we were going, well why 
are you contacting us?... we wanted to know what the whole thing 
was about … who referred us … we never did find that out …’ GP 
senior partner practice C 
 
 
Corroboration ‘we were just told when we had the feedback last week what we knew 
already…it was three days of practice time and then the feedback was a bit 
disappointing really.’ Practice Manager practice D 
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Outcomes (table 2) 
Within the timescale of this evaluation, the principal outcomes perceived by the practice staff 
were better skill mix and deployment of clinicians improving access for patients , better workflow 
arising from better deployment of administrative staff, better communication within practice 
teams and increased morale. The fact that staff were reporting these positive perceptions is, in 
itself, evidence of improved morale, and a variety of professional groups are represented, 
suggesting that changes were not only being perceived by those at managerial level (who had 
made the decision to work with the SCGP team). 
 There were perceptions in some practices that though some change had taken place it was the 
beginning of a process and more input was needed.  
One practice described a temporarily negative outcome in which the report produced by the 
SCGP team at the end of its scoping phase created some divisions between staff groups which 
contributed to two staff members leaving the practice, however the overall perception of the 
outcome was that communication had improved as a result. 
“I think it caused a break-up, certainly, for a short period of time…” practice manager practice A 
“it helped to improve things because it helped to have a lot more open conversations…I think 
we’ve established a better structure” GP partner practice A 
Two GPs (from different practices) expressed some anxiety about the provision of continuing 
support. 
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‘NHS England have now got to help us with a rescue plan…it’s become more of a rescue plan than 
an action plan’ GP Partner practice H 
‘I do hope nobody gets rid of them before we’re finished. It’s a valuable asset really…we can see 
some light at the end of the tunnel but we’re not out of the woods by any means.’ GP partner 
practice K 
Table 2: the outcomes 
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Group Quotes regarding Outcomes 
The NHS England staff ‘…[I have] no clear set criteria for success…[but] the team’s work has led to 
visible green shoots of recovery, may be manpower, may be patient 
satisfaction, maybe something else…’ 
 
‘...[the team are] able to take a practice, work with them very closely, help 
them prepare an action plan…not only bring the practice up to a level to get 
through the CQC inspection but to bring them up to a level that they are on a 
par with other practices.’  
 
‘…to see a practice that has gone from absolute despair to a practice that’s 
almost enjoying the process because they can see the benefits that they’re 
starting to get from not working in total isolation.’ 
 
 
The Supporting Change team  ‘the general feel of the place is a measure of success- smiling faces, relaxed, 
talking, light at end of tunnel feeling and can see a way out…’ 
 ‘[success is] going back to the practice to see how they’re getting on – their 
morale was low and they weren’t seeing their way out of this, and them 
saying we’ve had this crisis and this crisis and this is what we’ve done about 
it – solved it – and we have this crisis coming up and this is how we’re 
planning to deal with it, and with a confidence on their face…real success in 
this case is the turnaround in morale, in this case that they’re doing it 
themselves …but even better when they see these things as challenges but 
not crises, and just life – that’s just what needs doing’ 
 
Practice staff ‘… [it was] very, very good for morale and I think if morale is lifted you work 
better, so yes, in that sense it was useful. GP partner practice J 
 
‘we’ve got a prescribing lead now…we’ve shared a lot of the work out…we’ve 
got a management partner …’ GP partner 1 practice C 
 
‘it made us aware that we weren’t getting together as a group as often as 
we should…that prompted us to start doing it again.’ Nurse practice N 
 
‘there was nothing earth-shattering that they came up with…we were 
adopting a siege mentality…there was a lot of pressure…and perhaps getting 
together, talking…and developing more as a team…is the message that came 
from them…’ GP partner 1 practice K 
 
 it’s created good conversation in the practice…we talk more now…we were 
just doing the hamster wheel really’ GP partner 2 practice K 
 
‘it really has encouraged more open-ness within the surgery…’ Nurse 1 
practice K 
 
‘…it was good for people to be able to say honestly how they felt about 
things.’ Administrator practice K 
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CMO configurations (table 3) 
We present CMO configurations[19,20] relating to seven practices chosen to show a variety of 
different situations and practice needs. Amongst this group, there are practices with each of the 
following contexts 
 Practices which chose to approach the Team for help 
 Practices which were approached by the Team 
-those who took up the offer of help 
-those who did not take up the offer 
 A practice which had ‘failed’ a CQC inspection 
‘…there has been better communication from on high and that’s working its 
way through…’ Nurse practice F 
 
‘… better access for the patients … because we’ve got some advanced nurse 
practitioners in …’  Nurse practice K 
 
‘…[the team] supported us all the way through the process of 
recruitment…actually recruiting [to a practice leadership role] but also the 
concept of having [a person in that role]…looking at the whole structure and 
our forward strategy…helped us to solidify what our vision was…’ GP partner 
practice C 
 
‘To talk to somebody and have a chance to bounce your own ideas back and 
forth is positive in itself even without an action plan… in fact members of 
staff have come forward with ideas since [the Team] have come in and 
maybe it prompted that…just being asked sometimes prompts ideas…’ GP 
partner practice G 
 
‘[the manager] did a whole report…and told us where our weaknesses are 
where we need to improve, which was a good thing because by the time the 
CQC inspectors came we had…achieved all the things.’ Practice Manager 
practice E 
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Practices are included from the first two groups identified above which had an initial negative 
reaction but which took up the offer of help and reported good experiences overall, practices in 
which the reaction stayed negative and further input was declined, practices in which there 
were mixed responses from staff, and practices where change was clearly attributed to the 
SCGP team. 
Apart from the practice which was involved with the SCGP team because of a CQC inspection, 
these practices were initially engaged with the team in its early existence, which meant that 
there was sufficient time between the first and follow up interviews for some change to take 
place in the practices and practice staff to be able to evaluate the impact of the team.  
The other practices are not included either because it was considered that inclusion would not 
contribute anything more to the evaluation, or if data were incomplete because of time scales 
or practices’ choices about participation in the evaluation.  
Table 3: the CMO configurations 
Practice  CMO configurations 
1 Context: self-referral for management and leadership problems. 
Early negative reasoning mechanism: mistrust related to communication with the Team, leading 
to a delay in further engagement. 
Positive reasoning mechanism: external view/corroboration.  
Positive resource mechanism:  the expertise of the team’s manager in recruitment. 
Outcomes: perceptions of a more appropriate skill mix within the clinical and managerial teams 
and better access to appointments for patients. Ongoing work with the SCGP team. 
 
2 Context: practice approached by the SCGP team as an outlier in NHS performance indicators. 
Problems with management and leadership. 
Positive resource mechanism: the SCGP team’s manager, while the team as a unit was a negative 
mechanism due to disruption/divisions caused by the report. 
Negative reasoning mechanism: corroboration in that the practice perceived that they already 
knew what their development needs were and were addressing them. 
Outcome: perceptions that communication improved. The practice did not work with the SCGP 
team after the initial phase. 
 
3 Context: self-referral re an anticipated CQC inspection. Concerns about the nursing team.  
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Positive resource mechanisms: the specific expertise of the SCGP team’s manager and nurse, the 
action planning and the clinical backfill. 
Positive reasoning mechanisms: better preparation for the CQC inspection (related to better 
function and workload management) and advocacy within the practice teams.  
Outcomes: effective recruitment, better workflow and a good result in the CQC inspection. 
Ongoing work with the SCGP team. 
 
4 Context: practice approached by the SCGP team as an outlier in NHS performance indicators. 
Problems with skill mix in the nursing and managerial teams, and workflow.  
Early negative reasoning mechanism: shame. 
Positive reasoning mechanism: corroboration. 
Positive resource mechanism: expertise and practical support of the SCGP team’s manager. 
Outcomes: better skill mix in the management and nursing teams, and better workflow. Ongoing 
work with the SCGP team. 
 
5 Context: practice ‘in special measures’ after a CQC inspection with requirement for an action plan 
in a specific, and short, timescale. Management and leadership, deployment of clinical staff, and 
governance needed to be improved. 
Positive resource mechanisms: the expertise of the Team members and the action planning. The 
lead GP in the SCGP team was a specific resource for the lead GP in this practice- working on the 
organizational aspects of his consultations. 
Positive reasoning mechanisms: ‘sustainability’ (in that the practice thought its viability as a 
provider of general practice services would improve if it engaged with the SCGP team), and ‘action 
planning’ which would result in better function in terms of the CQC’s requirement that they 
produce and implement an action plan. 
Negative reasoning mechanisms:  shame, mistrust and regulation/inspection. Outcomes: 
increased morale of practice staff, more appointments for patients by means of recruitment and 
better skill mix, and ‘better workflow’. Ongoing work with the SCGP team. 
 
6 Context: practice approached by the SCGP team. There were a number of areas for development 
which the practice staff knew about but were unable to address because of workload. 
Positive reasoning mechanisms: external view/ corroboration and development of better 
functioning practice team. 
Positive resource mechanisms: multi-disciplinary expertise.  
No negative resource or reasoning mechanisms identified in the early interviews, but engagement 
ceased before some of the leadership development was completed. 
Outcomes: staff perceptions of better communication, a more appropriate skill mix and more 
appointments for patients. Work with the SCGP team ceased after the report was produced. 
 
7 Context: practice approached by the SCGP team as an outlier in NHS performance indicators. 
Problems with deployment and development of clinicians, and management and leadership. 
Positive resource mechanisms: expertise of the SCGP team and lack of disruption.  
Positive reasoning mechanisms: corroboration and normalization. 
Negative reasoning mechanism: ‘there wasn’t anything they could offer to help us with’. 
Outcome: increased morale as a direct result of external view mechanism. Work with the SCGP 
team ended after the report was produced. 
 
 
The programme specification 
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The following programme specification was developed from the CMO analysis (see figure 2) 
When practices are identified as performing poorly work with a well-functioning multi-disciplinary 
team which has appropriate expertise (knowledge, experience and skills) to help them to identify 
areas and strategies for improvement and then support them to implement these strategies, 
some practices will accept and benefit from the engagement. For others, especially where they 
have not actively sought the help of such a team, acceptance is difficult due to negative 
perceptions including shame, and these practices are less likely to continue with engagement or 
perceive a value in it. However, practices which engage as a result of a CQC inspection are likely 
to view engagement positively. Tailoring the intervention to the specific needs of the practice is 
critically important. The principal positive mechanism for change is the expertise of members of 
the team. Practices may not engage in a linear manner, and outcomes may be delayed.  
 
Insert figure 2 here: a summary of the contexts, mechanisms and outcomes 
 
DISCUSSION 
This evaluation has shown that when general practices engage with a team whose purpose is to 
support change, change can take place even in short timescale. There are clear signs of the ‘green 
shoots of recovery’ in the practices manifested in better communication, morale and skill mix 
(table 2).  
Using realist methodology, we have considered CMO configurations (box 1) to inform a 
programme specification. Mechanisms either belonged to the ‘resource’[19] of the Team or to 
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the ‘reasoning’[19] of the practice staff. While some mechanisms were predominantly positive 
or negative, the effects of others were contingent upon factors in individual practices’ contexts, 
such as the route to engagement with the SCGP team, influences of inspection and regulation, 
and the daily challenges experienced by the practices. The expertise of the SCGP team was 
consistently positive while the ‘external view’ provided by the SCGP team was variable and more 
likely to be positive when a practice had actively sought the input of the team even then some 
individuals viewed it negatively early in their involvement. 
In the current context of the NHS in England there is an emphasis on inspection and 
regulation[3-11] and negative feelings are known to arise in relation to this[11,30]. Where there 
is inspection and judgement against a standard, there is the possibility of failure to reach the 
standard. For this group of practices, the external standards which led to their engagement 
with the SCGP team were those of the NHS[3-5] and the CQC.[8]The ‘naming and shaming’ 
which takes place in the NHS[10,11]  is a process involving humiliation[31] and feelings of 
shame and anger may result, especially when there is a perceived risk of loss of public 
reputation and ‘standing within a given social sphere’.[32] The process of change itself, even 
when desired, also induces negative emotions[25] which may be explained by the Kubler-Ross 
Change Curve;[24] shock, anger and denial tend to be followed by acceptance and eventually 
more positive emotions. These negative reactions may have become focused on the SCGP team 
itself rather than on the need to change which may have been the real cause of them, and they 
may have been responsible for the difficulty some practice staff had in engaging with the SCGP 
team. For some practices, a specific negative emotion was a disincentive for engagement with 
the team, particularly related to concerns about how engagement might be perceived in local 
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medical communities. We interpreted and labelled this as ‘shame’, as it was related to 
practice’s perceptions that the SCGP team was for ‘failing practices’. It is possible that being 
seen to be needing help also contributed to this.[33] Both self-referring and  practices which 
had been approached by the team reported these negative reactions.  
The usefulness of both reasoning and resource mechanisms depended heavily on the quality of 
the relationships between practice staff and the team; dependent in their turn on skilled and 
sensitive communication in the contexts of the practices’ reactions to their situations. There are 
examples in table 1 of perceptions of suboptimal communication which affected the 
effectiveness of the SCGP team in promoting change; the negative mechanisms being ‘mistrust’ 
and ‘relationships’. 
For this group of practices, the issues which had led to their engagement with the team were 
very similar to those described by Rendel et al.;[18] low morale, leadership and management 
issues and staffing issues. 
Strengths and Limitations 
A strength of this work was the use of a recognized and relevant research methodology. 
Though the numbers are small, all practices which engaged with the team in its first two years 
were involved in the evaluation. A range of practice staff was interviewed, not only those in 
acknowledged leadership roles. Some practices which did not engage with the team beyond the 
initial stage participated in the evaluation, which gave balance to the data. 
There are limitations; two years is a short timescale in which to evaluate change, and review of 
the practices’ progress in the future is likely to yield useful data. Some of the more negative 
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emotions identified as having been generated by the need to change are difficult to discuss, 
and the researchers are aware that a deeper discussion would contribute much to the 
evaluation. Practices which did not engage at all with the team also declined to participate in 
the evaluation; the views of this important group of practices are therefore not represented. 
Those practices which had engaged with the SCGP team for reasons related to CQC inspections 
(which carry the ultimate sanctions of prosecution or closure,[8]) are likely to be highly 
motivated to change. The study is embedded in the context of a highly inspected, highly 
regulated service: generalizability to less heavily managed systems cannot be assumed. 
The evaluation team included two general practitioners who work in the same medical 
community as the SCGP team. This meant that they were exposed to the informal perceptions 
of others in that community regarding the team’s work, however, neither worked in practices 
with which the team was involved, and both are experienced in the practice of reflexivity as 
part of qualitative research methodology. Though this is likely to have reduced the possibility of 
subjective bias, it is not possible to remove the effects of this completely. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the current context of the English NHS, this support team has been effective in promoting 
change within practice teams via the mechanisms of an external view on their situations and 
shared expertise in their individual contexts of a need to improve. There were clear signs of 
‘green shoots of recovery’ in that participants reported  better morale, skill mix and 
communication within all of the practice teams. Nevertheless, practice staff may have negative 
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reactions to such teams, related to perceptions of shame and feelings of mistrust arising from 
the current context of inspection and regulation in the NHS which may impact on relationships 
with team members. 
This study demonstrates that, to be successful, such interventions need to be carefully tailored 
and responsive to the practices’ needs. Relationships between team members and practice staff 
are central to success and team members need to be sensitive to the multiple and, at times, 
conflicting drivers for practice engagement and change. Careful communication is essential but 
change can be achieved. 
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